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3 November 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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
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
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India - Communist China: The Indian Army believes the Chinese will soon renew their offensive in the Northeast Frontier Agency with the aim of securing the northern approaches to the pass at Se La. Indian and Chinese forces now are about equal in strength in this area.

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The Indian Communist Party's unqualified support of Nehru's position in the current crisis puts the Indian Communist leadership for the first time officially at odds with Moscow.

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Peiping's People's Daily on 27 October also attacked Indian party chairman Dange as a "self-styled Marxist-Leninist" and accused the party's nationalist right wing of a departure from the principles of "proletarian internationalism."

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South Vietnam: (A number of top South Vietnamese military figures apparently still believe that the security situation requires drastic political changes.)

(In late October, Brigadier General Ton That Dinh, one of the country's three area commanders, stated that the public had lost confidence in President Diem and his brother Nhu because of their continued toleration of corruption in high circles.)

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(Diem's reluctance to take any action against high civilian officials tainted by a lottery scandal may have aroused resentment. Military leaders are concerned that, despite aggressive government security operations, Viet Cong guerrilla activity, with considerable peasant support, continues to erode government authority.)

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Angola: Opposition whites in Angola, possibly supported by some local Portuguese military leaders, are reportedly organizing a secessionist movement.

The disillusionment among the province's nearly 200,000 whites lies in Angola's stagnant economic and political condition, coupled with a long history of close and irritating control from Lisbon. Top military and civil authorities came close to challenging Lisbon's authority over the issue of Overseas Minister Moreira's dismissal in September of the popular reformist governor general. The whites apparently regard the recent reforms announced by Lisbon as mere window dressing to hide more stringent Portuguese direction of Angolan affairs.

The secessionists presumably believe that with army backing they would have enough security resources to keep extreme African nationalists under control, and they probably would not be averse to an alliance with Africans they consider moderate. Nevertheless, their activities will aggravate Salazar's security problems and may eventually make it more difficult for the whites to hold the line against the Africans.

An unconfirmed report originating in Lisbon that Premier Salazar will replace Moreira in the near future because of his bungling of Angolan affairs may reflect the government's awareness that some gesture is necessary to allay the rising unrest in Angola.

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Bolivia: President Paz may be planning another wholesale arrest of opposition and other political leaders he considers dangerous to his position..

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Paz has ordered the review and updating of lists of "Communists" in preparation to arrest them. The pretext for the arrests would be the gravity of the international situation.

Although the Communists may now be Paz' main target, his security sweeps for some time have hit non-Communist and anti-Communist elements hardest, thereby indirectly strengthening the left wing of the MNR government party.

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Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

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The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

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